Milton Ezrati

Rising developer defaults say the country has a long way to go before it gets out of the woods.

Contrary to much popular belief, Beijing's insistence on centralized economic control is far from a strength.

China has lost its competitive edge in several areas—notably, furniture making—because of Trump’s tariffs, but also because of fundamental cost considerations.

Contrary to much media commentary and political fear mongering in the West, Beijing’s centralized economic control is more weakness than strength.

Beijing so fears technological competition that it has clamped down more than ever on outbound investments and overseas Chinese business arrangements.

The April–May surge in China’s exports does not mean Beijing has beaten Trump’s tariffs. This strength will fade, but new aspects do promise durability.

Beijing has decided to change its hukou system of worker registration. Reform will help but not enough to meet all China’s needs.

Beijing will have to jump very high hurdles indeed to achieve Chinese self-reliance in the production of critical semiconductors.

Directing China’s banks to follow political instead of commercial criteria invites a rerun of the property crisis, just in a different sector.

While China and the United States vie for power globally, Beijing seems to have it in for Japan, and Tokyo has yet to responded fully.