Yoni Ben Menachem

Despite American military superiority, a combination of asymmetric strategy, internal cohesion, and control over the Strait of Hormuz has prevented a swift military defeat of Iran. Share this Table of Contents No headings were found on this page. The war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, which has now entered a temporary pause ahead of fragile negotiations, raises a central question: how is it that a military confrontation with one of the world's strongest powers has not ended in a clear American strategic victory over Iran? Senior security officials report that the United States wielded overwhelming military force, launching massive airstrikes and deploying sophisticated naval assets. Still, the two primary objectives—reopening the Strait of Hormuz and fully eliminating Iran's nuclear program—remain unfulfilled. According to these senior officials, there are several explanations for the survival of the Iranian regime. First , the constraints of traditional military force. Air and naval superiority no longer ensure decisive victory when the adversary relies on asymmetric tactics. Iran avoided direct confrontation with the United States. Instead, it employed attrition tactics and restricted its adversary's operational latitude. The primary instrument in this approach was its arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones. These inexpensive, hard-to-intercept weapons have redefined the dynamics of conflict. They forced the US Navy to maintain a distance from Iranian shores to avoid missile range and made any approach toward Iranian territory a significant risk. In doing so, Iran effectively offset part of its opponents' technological edge. The maritime domain clearly illustrated this shift. The US Navy failed to impose full control over the Strait of Hormuz and avoided deep offensive operations. Rather than serving as a decisive force, it became primarily a supporting instrument. This represents a conceptual shift, as naval dominance has long been considered a cornerstone of American deterrence. Second , while the United States reportedly destroyed Iran's formal navy, it did not target the small fast boats operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, for reasons that remain unclear. These vessels enforce Iran's de facto ability to threaten or close the Strait of Hormuz. Third , Iran's capacity to preserve internal unity. Contrary to expectations, the campaign did not trigger collapse or widespread revolt. Segments of the opposition, including reformists, adopted a protective national stance, recognizing that regime collapse could fracture the state. This undercut one of Washington's core assumptions for quick pressure. Large-scale protests that erupted last January, involving tens of thousands of demonstrators, subsided after approximately 35,000 were reportedly killed by the Basij. The public was both intimidated by the regime and waiting for President Trump's cue for renewed protests, per his earlier promises. Security sources indicate the regime's handling of earlier protests set a precedent during the war: relentless security, strong deterrence, and readiness for extreme force kept Iran's home front stable. Fourth , Iran has sustained strategic flexibility. It has not yielded on essential issues—its nuclear program or its missile capabilities—and has maintained a policy of ambiguity and pressure. Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz is now a pivotal tool for exerting economic and security leverage over both the United States and the global economy. If a decisive outcome is also tied to political constraints. As the campaign dragged on, domestic pressure on President Trump within the United States mounted, making further escalation more difficult. In these circumstances, even overwhelming military superiority does not guarantee strategic success. Modern wars are fought at a distance with missiles, drones, and unmanned systems. In this context, even weaker states can deter and avoid rapid defeat. Fifth , the absence of a large-scale ground operation inside Iran is key. It is extremely difficult to topple a determined authoritarian regime using air power alone. The conclusion emerging from the war is clear: Iran was not defeated militarily, not because it won, but because it successfully adapted to the new rules of warfare. It combined relatively inexpensive capabilities, strategic thinking, operational flexibility, and strict internal control, thereby preventing its adversaries from achieving their objectives. The key question now is what the next phase holds. For now, the Iranian regime's singular achievement is survival. Will economic pressure eventually break Iran? Will Trump's naval blockade force surrender? Or will only a blockade plus massive infrastructure strikes suffice? The answer is still unclear. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

Mojtaba Khamenei's selection as Supreme Leader has sharply limited his authority, making his role largely symbolic, as he now primarily endorses, rather than drives, state decisions. Share this Table of Contents No headings were found on this page. Senior security officials state that Israeli intelligence agencies have now assembled a comprehensive assessment of who truly controls Iran. Evidently, Mojtaba Khamenei remains hidden at an undisclosed location, known only to a select few, due to fears he could be targeted by Israel. Though seriously wounded, his mental faculties are intact, and he receives regular updates. The killing of his father, Ali Khamenei, the former Supreme Leader, occurred on the first day of the current war, along with the deaths of senior regime figures. This event led to a profound transformation in Iran's power structure. Iran issues written statements in the name of Mojtaba Khamenei, without images or recordings. Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that Israel may soon target Mojtaba Khamenei. On April 23, after a security briefing, Katz said: “We await a U.S. green light to eliminate the Khamenei dynasty and its successors.” Now, after two months of war with the United States and Israel, Iran is no longer governed by a single leader wielding undisputed authority. This marks a surprising break from the political tradition that has prevailed since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, a shift that could lead Tehran to adopt more hardline positions as it weighs the possibility of reaching an agreement with Washington. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the political system has revolved around the figure of the Supreme Leader, who holds ultimate authority over all major decisions. That reality has now fundamentally changed. Iran has entered a phase in which the center of power has shifted to the Supreme National Security Council, where commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hold dominant influence, in a system increasingly characterized by the absence of a clear, decisive authority. Mojtaba Khamenei, the new Supreme Leader, remains at the top of the system. He was elevated largely under pressure from IRGC commanders, led by General Ahmad Vahidi, on the Assembly of Experts. Senior security officials say he owes his appointment to the Revolutionary Guards and has effectively become a “rubber stamp,” providing legitimacy for their decisions. His responsibilities involve approving, not formulating, military leadership decisions. Real power lies with a hardline group operating through the Supreme National Security Council and the IRGC, which now shapes Iran's military and political direction. This shift in power centers has slowed and complicated Iran's decision-making process. Leadership is fragmented, and responses to U.S.-Iran negotiations can take days. IRGC Commander General Ahmad Vahidi plays a central role in strategic decision-making, including ceasefire arrangements and negotiations. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is sidelined, while Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi acts mainly as a limited envoy. Israeli intelligence assesses Iran is shifting from a religious-theocratic model to rule by the security establishment, led by the IRGC—possibly meaning a harsher foreign policy and tighter domestic control. A senior official said, “At this rate, Iran could become like North Korea.” Despite U.S. and Israeli pressure, Iran's regime shows no signs of collapse. Instead, an internal consensus has formed: avoid full-scale war, keep leverage—especially the Strait of Hormuz—and seek to exit the crisis stronger. In conclusion, Iran's political system is marked by a shift: while formal authority rests with the Supreme Leader, real power now resides with the security establishment. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not just an executive arm but the central force directing the country, with control concentrated among the military-security elite. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

Mojtaba Khamenei's elevation has sharply limited his authority, rendering his role largely symbolic.

Differences in tempo, perceptions of time, and calculations of profit are shaping the negotiations between Washington and Tehran, as time itself increasingly becomes a weapon. The confrontation between the U.S. and Iran is now acquiring an entirely new dimension. Share this Table of Contents No headings were found on this page. Senior political sources say the current war, still ongoing, confirms that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has the final say in Iran's domestic and foreign affairs. According to these sources, the IRGC has become the dominant force in the country, wielding decisive power and steadily expanding its influence. What began as a military organization has evolved into the central actor shaping Iranian politics, pushing the traditional political establishment to the margins. Talks between the United States and Iran are set to resume this week in Islamabad. President Trump aims to reach an agreement before his visit to China on the 14th and his meeting with President Xi Jinping. Vice President J.D. Vance is expected to head the American negotiating delegation. However, senior Israeli officials express deep skepticism, given the significant gaps between the two sides' positions. Seeking an agreement before Trump's China trip signals to the Iranians that the president is under pressure to arrive in Beijing with an achievement, which, according to political sources, weakens the American negotiating position. They believe President Trump should project determination and self-confidence. This pressure is heightened by reports that Trump wants to end the war due to the upcoming World Cup and November midterm elections. Washington believes military pressure, the Hormuz blockade, and tougher sanctions will compel Iran to concede. But Tehran centers on enduring pressure and adapting. Thus, the sides pursue different success standards, casting doubt on a real agreement. Senior political officials point to a complete lack of trust between the parties as a central obstacle. Iran does not believe that the United States will honor long-term commitments regarding sanctions relief, especially after the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement. Washington, meanwhile, doubts that Iran would respect any agreement related to its nuclear program or regional policies, given Tehran's consistent reliance on deception and manipulation. Without fundamental changes in expectations on both sides, credible trust mechanisms, and a genuine diplomatic path, negotiations will likely remain stalled, and escalation will be managed rather than resolved. According to these political sources, the crisis between Iran and the United States goes beyond disputes over the nuclear program, sanctions, or control of the Strait of Hormuz. At its core, it is a clash of two worldviews: fundamentally different beliefs about the purpose and conduct of negotiations. On one side stands the United States, or more precisely, President Trump, conducting the talks with the mindset of a fast-moving dealmaker seeking quick, clear, and measurable results. On the other side, Iran approaches the confrontation with a long-term, methodical strategy, seeing each negotiation round as part of a larger, ongoing struggle for influence and power. The issue at the heart of this confrontation is a profound absence of trust, which shapes every stage of negotiation and strategy. To Iran, the U.S. has broken agreements, shifted positions, left the 2015 nuclear deal, and mixed pressure with engagement. Thus, Iran views negotiations as both an opportunity and a risk. This explains Iran's insistence on preconditions and refusal to discuss red lines like surrendering or halting uranium enrichment. In Washington, a different logic prevails. Decisions are shaped by domestic politics, public opinion, midterms, internal rivalries, regional pressures, and the need to counter Russia and China. Thus, negotiations swing between threats and compromise, diplomacy and hardened positions. The outcome is inconsistent diplomacy: declarations seeking agreement contrasted with pressure, sanctions, and military signaling. From Iran's perspective, this signals weakness, not strategy. Iran views time strategically, leveraging delays and crises within ongoing negotiations. Every delay in negotiations, every temporary crisis, and every renewal of external pressure is viewed as part of a prolonged campaign designed to exhaust the adversary through a war of attrition rather than rush toward a settlement. Meanwhile, Iran shows unity around its hardline doctrine: reject negotiations under coercion and don't surrender assets without major gains. Security officials say the gap is more than political; it stems from opposing views on power and international order. In Washington, talks are seen as a means to a fast deal. In Tehran, negotiations are a continuous struggle. In the United States, time is a constraint, pushing negotiators to reach conclusions quickly. To Iran, time offers a strategic advantage in negotiations and confrontation. This gap creates a situation in which each side interprets the other's actions as mistakes or signs of weakness rather than as deliberate strategic choices. Despite these differences, security sources assess that in the short term, given its military achievements, the United States holds a clear tactical advantage: economic leverage, regional military presence, and coordination with key allies. In the medium and long term, the outlook is more complex. Iran has developed a relatively high capacity to absorb sanctions and pressure, while also building a regional network of influence that enables it to apply indirect leverage. In addition, its attrition strategy is better suited to prolonged confrontations with no rapid, decisive outcome. Consequently, a prevailing assessment among some Israeli security officials is that if the negotiations remain short-term and narrowly focused, the United States will maintain the upper hand and dictate the terms of an agreement. If the crisis turns into a drawn-out war of attrition, Iran is expected to improve its position and possibly impose a new reality. The struggle between Tehran and Washington centers on more than the nuclear file or sanctions. It is fundamentally a competition between irreconcilable perceptions of time, political culture, and the use of power, sharpening the difficulties inherent in any negotiation. This confrontation pits the American fast-deal negotiator against the Iranian strategist of attrition. The main question is not who is right, but which side can endure the longest, as time becomes the central weapon. Ultimately, the decision on whether to move toward an agreement will rest with the Revolutionary Guards, who are highly skilled at the politics of perception and image. If they sense that President Trump is under intense pressure to secure a deal, the negotiations are likely to drag on, while Tehran attempts to turn up the pressure to secure further American concessions. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

Hizbullah's objective is to transform the northern front into a prolonged war of attrition, but if this fails to force an Israeli withdrawal from the buffer zone, the terror group may resort to suicide-style attacks. Share this Table of Contents Israeli defense officials assess that Hizbullah's intensified use of explosive drones and coordinated UAV swarms is intended to wear down IDF combat forces and undermine the sense of security in northern Israel. At the same time, the Israeli military is struggling to contain the expansion of Hizbullah's explosive drone capabilities, as the organization increases pressure on the newly established buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Officially, a ceasefire remains in effect between the IDF and Hizbullah in southern Lebanon. In practice, however, the situation appears very different. The IDF Spokesperson announced on May 13 that since the ceasefire understandings came into force, the Israeli Air Force has struck more than 1,100 Hizbullah targets and eliminated over 350 operatives. Senior security officials confirm that Hizbullah has entered a new phase of confrontation in southern Lebanon, shifting to what it defines as a “war of attrition” against the Israeli military presence there. According to these officials, this marks a far more complex stage than the familiar cycle of limited exchanges that characterized recent years. Hizbullah is now operating according to a multi-layered attrition strategy aimed not only at inflicting casualties on the IDF, but also at undermining the Israeli home front's sense of security and gradually eroding Israel's operational freedom along the border. Senior Israeli security officials say Hizbullah's recent operations indicate a transition from isolated rocket launches and sporadic drone attacks to coordinated and sophisticated strike formations. The organization is reportedly employing a tactic described by military officials as “integrated fire ambushes.” Under this method, a military target is first identified, followed by an initial strike using an explosive drone or precision fire. Rescue, evacuation, and reinforcement forces arriving at the scene are then targeted in subsequent attacks. The purpose of this tactic is to prolong operational incidents, increase casualties, and sustain pressure on the IDF's response systems. From Hizbullah's perspective, the goal is not merely tactical damage to a specific unit, but rather the systematic erosion of the entire operational chain of the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon, from frontline combat troops to evacuation and logistical support systems. Simultaneously, Hizbullah has expanded its use of coordinated attack drone swarms operating at the same time. The objective is to complicate the ability of Israeli air defense systems to confront multiple threats simultaneously, generate confusion within radar and detection networks, and gradually degrade interception efficiency. Explosive Drones Senior Israeli military officials estimate that over the past year, Hizbullah has turned explosive drones into one of its primary force-building priorities. After drawing lessons from previous rounds of fighting, the organization concluded that its existing capabilities in this field were insufficient. During the ceasefire period between November 2024 and March 2026, Hizbullah reportedly invested substantial resources in procuring, producing, and assembling explosive drones while simultaneously training specialized operators. As early as June 2025, the IDF carried out strikes against a series of drone and UAV production workshops throughout Lebanon in an effort to disrupt Hizbullah's growing capabilities. According to military sources, unlike Hizbullah's organized UAV force, the explosive drone network operates through a decentralized structure. Operators are dispersed across various units in southern Lebanon, some of which are affiliated with the elite Radwan Force. Each operator functions within the geographic framework of his assigned area. Israeli military officials believe this decentralized structure makes the network significantly harder to dismantle, since there is no single command unit whose elimination would paralyze operations. Current assessments indicate Hizbullah possesses approximately 100 qualified operators capable of handling advanced fiber-optic-controlled explosive drones. Operating such systems is highly complex and requires specialized training, making these operators a limited and strategically valuable asset for the organization. Most were trained during the latest ceasefire period. As a result, Israeli efforts are now increasingly focused on identifying and eliminating the drone operators themselves, based on the assessment that targeting them could significantly reduce the scale of the threat. Despite these efforts, the IDF has reportedly succeeded in eliminating only between five and ten operators so far, a figure considered relatively low compared to the overall size of the network. Meanwhile, Hizbullah continues training additional operators. The IDF estimates that most drone operators are active south of the Litani River but outside the “Yellow Line” currently controlled by Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, largely because of the range limitations of the fiber-optic systems used by Hizbullah. Nevertheless, there are indications that in some cases Hizbullah operatives have managed to infiltrate the Israeli security zone itself in order to launch drones deeper into Israeli territory. Security officials say Hizbullah's focus on targeting engineering vehicles, bulldozers, artillery positions, fuel tankers, and logistical infrastructure points to a clear attempt to undermine the IDF's ability to establish a stable presence along the border strip and in the villages where Israeli forces are operating in southern Lebanon. At its core, this is a struggle over freedom of maneuver and Israel's ability to maintain secure control zones near the border. However, the broader significance of the campaign is increasingly felt within the Israeli home front itself. As Hizbullah drones succeed in penetrating deeper into Israeli territory or threatening northern communities, the sense of attrition among residents continues to grow. The concern is not only the potential physical damage, but also the perception that Israel's defense systems are no longer capable of providing full protection against the evolving threat. Any damage to the image of Israel's air defense systems, particularly in incidents where drones manage to penetrate undetected, is considered especially sensitive. For years, Israel's security doctrine has relied heavily on technological superiority and the ability to protect the civilian rear. Every incident that undermines this perception quickly becomes a significant psychological achievement for Hizbullah. Senior security officials assess that Hizbullah has intensified its explosive drone attacks after concluding that it had discovered what it views as the “soft underbelly” of the IDF in southern Lebanon. According to these assessments, Hizbullah's objective is to transform the northern front into a prolonged war of attrition against the Israeli military. If this strategy fails to force an Israeli withdrawal from the newly established buffer zone, Hizbullah is expected to return to suicide-style attacks inside the security area itself, a development that would present Israel with an ongoing security and psychological challenge. “It appears Hizbullah understands that it is fighting for its survival and is prepared to absorb significant losses in order to restore its damaged image inside Lebanon following the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and the Israeli Mossad's pager operation,” a senior security official said. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

May 18, 2026 Israel views the killing of the head of Hamas's military wing in Gaza as a significant intelligence and operational achievement. However, Hamas will likely continue to reject disarmament demands and will move quickly to appoint a successor to project continuity and sustain the struggle against Israel. Share this Senior security officials say that the elimination of Izz al-Din al-Haddad, head of Hamas's military wing in the Gaza Strip, on May 15, was highly significant. They describe it as an important tactical intelligence and operational success, but not one that is likely to soften Hamas's refusal to disarm. A senior security source said that al-Haddad's mistake was that he stopped hiding in the tunnel network and resumed operating above ground, believing that he enjoyed immunity from Israeli assassination attempts. According to security officials, al-Haddad also changed his external appearance several times in an effort to evade Israeli intelligence, but to no avail. Israel's Shin Bet security service reportedly identified the new identities he had adopted at an early stage. The Israel Defense Forces and the Shin Bet monitored him for a prolonged period before the political leadership authorized the operation to eliminate him. Security officials assess that eliminating al-Haddad, who was considered one of the planners of the October 7, 2023, massacre, is highly important in terms of “closing the circle” and sending a message to Hamas that Israel will pursue everyone involved in planning and carrying out the attack. However, they believe the assassination could actually reinforce Hamas's refusal to disarm, since the movement is a jihadist organization determined to convey the opposite message, namely that it will not surrender to Israeli pressure and will continue its jihad against the State of Israel and the Jewish people. The killing of al-Haddad is also not expected to affect the Trump administration's decision to continue implementing its 20-point peace plan for the Gaza Strip through the “Peace Council” headed by Nikolay Mladenov. Senior security officials say the operation sends a clear warning to Hamas operatives that the ceasefire in Gaza does not grant them immunity, and that Israel remains determined to dismantle Hamas militarily and remove it from power. The newspaper Rai al-Youm reported on May 16, citing Egyptian sources, that intensive contacts had begun following the assassination in an effort to prevent the collapse of negotiations concerning Gaza. A delegation representing the Palestinian factions is expected to return to Cairo next Tuesday for further talks. On May 16, Hamas-affiliated website Al-Rissalah Net wrote: Israel's military and psychological escalation at this stage reflects an attempt to exert pressure and create a new reality, in light of its difficulty in achieving the goals of the war and the continuation of the open confrontation in Gaza. Tel Aviv is using the tool of ‘targeted assassinations' in an effort to restore its deterrence image, which has eroded in recent months. While Israeli attacks on the Strip continue, the Palestinian message remains clear: commanders may be killed, but the flag does not fall. The resistance that produced this generation is capable of producing a generation even more determined and more deeply connected to the land and the cause. Who Will Succeed al-Haddad? Senior security officials estimate that Hamas will move swiftly to appoint a replacement for al-Haddad in order to signal that his elimination will not alter the balance of power in Gaza or impair Hamas's operations. It is still unclear who will replace him. Several senior officials of the military wing remain alive, and the successor is expected to be chosen from among them. Among the leading candidates are: Hussein Fayyad, known as “Abu Hamza,” is the commander of the Beit Hanoun Battalion in Hamas's military wing. Mohammed Oudeh, head of Hamas military intelligence and one of the planners of the October 2023 attacks on communities surrounding Gaza. He replaced Ali Ghandour as commander of the Northern Gaza Brigade after Ghandour was killed by the IDF in November 2023. Haitham al-Hawajri, commander of the Shati refugee camp battalion. He led operations against Israel on October 7, 2023, and was involved in Hamas activities around Shifa Hospital. Mohannad Rajab, commander of the Northern Gaza Brigade, who replaced al-Haddad after the latter was promoted to head Hamas's military wing in Gaza. Tawfiq Abu Na'im, head of Hamas's security apparatus in Gaza and a senior military wing official. He is considered close to Yahya Sinwar and was released as part of the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal. Nafiz Tbeikh, commander of the Daraj-Tuffah sector in northern Gaza. He previously headed Hamas's military inspection unit and was considered close to Ahmed Jabari, the former Hamas military chief assassinated by Israel. Imad Akel, head of Hamas's home front command structure, is responsible for combat support systems, including logistics, operational infrastructure, weapons preparation, and coordination between field units. Several commentators in Gaza believe that Mohammed Oudeh is the leading candidate to succeed al-Haddad. The assassination of al-Haddad comes amid continuing uncertainty within Hamas's external leadership. Hamas announced on May 16 that the latest round of elections for the positions of movement leader and head of the political bureau ended without a decisive result, and that another round of voting will therefore take place. The two leading candidates are Khaled Mashal and Khalil al-Hayya. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

Within the Palestinian arena, questions are being raised over Tehran's inclusion of Lebanon in any arrangement with Washington while excluding Hamas and Gaza. Israeli security officials assess that this reflects a strategic decision by Iran, one that places Hizbullah at the top of the “Axis of Resistance” priorities. Table of Contents No headings were found on this page. On May 23, 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sent a letter to Hizbullah Secretary-General Naim Qassem stating that Iran would not abandon its demand for an end to the “aggression against Lebanon” as a fundamental condition for any permanent agreement to end the war with the United States. On May 24, Hizbullah confirmed in an official statement that Qassem had received the message from Araghchi, which declared that “the Islamic Republic, until the very last moment, will never cease supporting movements seeking justice and freedom, foremost among them Hizbullah, the victorious resistance movement.” The letter further stated that “from the very first moment several regional states entered mediation efforts aimed at reducing tensions between Iran and the United States, the Islamic Republic linked any possible agreement to a ceasefire in Lebanon,” emphasizing that “this important issue remains a non-negotiable principle and an integral part of the just demands of the Iranian government and our heroic people, and it will remain so in the future.” Araghchi also clarified that “in the latest proposal submitted by the Islamic Republic through the Pakistani mediator, aimed at achieving a permanent and stable end to the war, the demand to include Lebanon within the ceasefire framework was explicitly emphasized.” Hassan Fadlallah, a member of Hizbullah's “Loyalty to the Resistance” parliamentary bloc, stated on May 24 that the accelerating regional developments would also affect Lebanon. He urged the Lebanese government to take advantage of the changing regional environment in order to halt the “Israeli aggression” and protect southern Lebanon. Speaking during a Hizbullah memorial ceremony for fighters killed in battles around the town of Khirbet Silm, Fadlallah stressed that “the Islamic Republic of Iran stands alongside Lebanon and the resistance,” adding that Tehran had tied any agreement with Washington to ending the war in Lebanon and across the region. Meanwhile, commentators in the Gaza Strip have expressed considerable astonishment that Iran linked Lebanon to any agreement with the United States while refraining from doing the same for Gaza and Hamas, despite Hamas being a clear component of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance.” This is particularly notable given that Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated by Israel in Tehran on July 31, 2024. Senior Israeli security officials estimate that Iran is operating according to a clear strategic hierarchy in which the Lebanese arena is viewed as far more important than Gaza and Hamas. There are several central reasons for this assessment. First, from Tehran's perspective, Hizbullah constitutes the most important strategic asset within the “Axis of Resistance.” The organization serves as Iran's primary deterrent force against Israel, possessing a vast arsenal of missiles, rockets, UAVs, and explosive drones, as well as direct influence along Israel's northern border and the capability to threaten the Israeli home front. For this reason, Iran sees restoring Hizbullah's strength and ending the fighting in Lebanon as a top-tier national security interest. By contrast, Hamas and the Gaza Strip are viewed by the Iranian leadership as a less critical strategic arena. The war in Gaza has already significantly weakened Hamas, while large portions of the Strip's military and civilian infrastructure have been destroyed by Israel. Therefore, from Iran's perspective, although Hamas retains ideological and symbolic importance, it is not considered a strategic asset on the same level as Hizbullah. Another reason is that the current negotiations with the United States are focused primarily on preventing a broader regional escalation, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, securing Iranian oil exports, and regulating the direct confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States. Lebanon is directly tied to this confrontation because of Hizbullah's involvement and the fear of a full-scale regional war. The Gaza Strip, by contrast, is viewed by the Iranian leadership more as a distinct Palestinian-Israeli arena. According to Israeli security assessments, Iran concluded that it would be unable to impose a comprehensive arrangement covering both Gaza and Lebanon simultaneously on Israel and the United States. Tehran, therefore, chose to focus its efforts on the arena where it possesses a far more direct and powerful lever of influence, namely Hizbullah in Lebanon. Another possible factor is the growing tension in recent years between Tehran and Hamas leadership, particularly regarding the management of the war and its devastating consequences for the Gaza Strip. By contrast, Iran's relationship with Hizbullah is considered far closer and more disciplined. In the eyes of the Iranian leadership, Hizbullah's command structure is viewed as significantly more obedient and reliable than Hamas leadership, which is also Sunni. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

May 28, 2026 The emerging agreement with Washington is viewed in Tehran as a strategic achievement signaling a shift in the regional balance of power. Iranian officials and media portray the memorandum as evidence of Washington's retreat from its original demands and as a failure of Western pressure. Table of Contents No headings were found on this page. In Iran, the emerging memorandum of understanding with the United States is not just seen as an end to the war, but also as a pivotal moment poised to shift the Middle East power balance, a perspective emphasized by senior security officials who observe Iranian leadership. From Tehran's perspective, shifting from prolonged military confrontation to gradual negotiations is a major strategic gain, especially after sustained military, economic, and diplomatic pressure from the United States and Israel. According to Iranian media, Tehran insisted on a phased rather than comprehensive agreement, and Washington ultimately accepted the step-by-step approach. Tehran presents this as evidence of the United States retreating from its initial demands, highlighting the shift in Washington's stance. The approach is based on the view that Washington abandoned its early push for a rapid, comprehensive deal imposed under military pressure. Tehran interprets this as proof that force failed to achieve U.S. aims, such as the dismantling of Iran's nuclear program, weakening the regime, or reducing its regional standing. Security officials say Tehran views the memorandum as a tactical win from their strategy of delay and endurance during talks. Instead of being dragged into a comprehensive agreement under pressure, the Iranian leadership succeeded in imposing a phased model based on sequential steps. First came a ceasefire, followed by the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, then the lifting of the naval blockade, and the release of frozen Iranian assets. Only after these steps did more complex discussions regarding the nuclear program and the sanctions imposed on Iran take place. Iran sees U.S. acceptance of the phased framework as validation of Tehran's preserved strategic leverage. Security officials say Iranian leaders stress the Islamic Republic did not surrender, abandon principles, or agree to fully dismantle its nuclear program or strategic capabilities. Iranian media and regime-aligned commentators portray this as a political setback for Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu. They claim Israel wanted America to fight for regime change and weaken the “Axis of Resistance.” In reality, Washington chose compromise and accommodation. Iranian analysis maintains that the agreement does not mean regional domination by Iran, but instead signifies a new balance of power that legitimizes Iran as a central player shaping the regional order—a central objective for Tehran. It believes that easing some pressure and sanctions will allow Iran to expand ties with Gulf states, strengthen its role in the energy market, and increase its regional influence. At the same time, Iranian leaders know the agreement is fragile. Tehran is concerned that Israel will pressure the U.S. administration to harden its stance or even restart military confrontation. U.S. criticism grows, too, notably from Republican Senators Ted Cruz and Lindsey Graham, who call the memorandum a dangerous concession. In Iran, such criticism is presented as more proof that Tehran prevented unconditional capitulation. As a result, the Iranian leadership continues to project a dual message: on the one hand, openness to an agreement and negotiations; on the other, a high level of military readiness, coupled with repeated assertions that Iran does not trust the United States. From Tehran's perspective, the memorandum of understanding signifies the start of a new phase in determining the regional order, reflecting Iran's belief in its growing influence and strategic leverage. General Ali Abdollahi, commander of “Khatem al-Anbiya,” recently highlighted both the military's awareness of the agreement's fragility and its distrust of Washington. He told Iranian media: “We are in wartime conditions; all armed forces remain on maximum alert at all levels.” Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

Fatah's eighth conference exposed the depth of the movement's internal divisions and its growing detachment from the Palestinian public in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas is concerned that the anticipated agreement would remove many of the strategic constraints currently limiting Israel, leave Gaza outside the framework of any deal, and enable Israel to intensify military pressure on the Strip. Table of Contents No headings were found on this page. Hamas has remained publicly silent about the advanced talks between Washington and Tehran to end the conflict. However, commentators in Gaza aligned with the movement report that senior Hamas officials are increasingly concerned about two parallel developments. The first is Israel's new policy, as described by observers. This involves gradually eroding the ‘yellow line' in Gaza and expanding its campaign of targeted assassinations against senior military wing operatives, allegedly with American backing. The second is the prospect that any future U.S.-Iran agreement will exclude the Gaza Strip entirely, leaving it vulnerable to Israeli actions. In private discussions, Hamas officials reportedly describe Gaza's exclusion from the equation as troubling. They believe this could let Israel use its full military power in the Strip without fear of triggering broader escalation. Negotiation channels between Washington and Tehran suggest the primary focus of current understandings is on Lebanon, arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz, and the Iranian nuclear issue. Gaza, by contrast, has not been part of the discussions. For Hamas, this signals that the international community seeks to stabilize the region without addressing Gaza's ongoing crisis. Senior security officials say Hamas's main concern is that a U.S.-Iran agreement would relieve Israel of many strategic pressures. When the possibility of broader confrontation with Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen remained, Israel had to divide its military and strategic focus. However, if tensions with Iran subside, Israel could devote substantially greater resources to the campaign in Gaza. Officials say developments in Lebanon are being closely watched in Gaza. Reports indicate that understandings between Iran and the United States may include a full ceasefire in Lebanon and new security arrangements along Israel's northern border. Should such a scenario materialize, Hamas would view it as the neutralization of one of the principal fronts that has exerted pressure on Israel since the outbreak of the war. Within Hamas, there is an assessment that Israel's political leadership could regard such an agreement as a strategic opportunity. Instead of facing multiple threats, Israel could present diplomatic gains with Iran to its public. At the same time, it could intensify military operations in Gaza to try to achieve a more decisive outcome against Hamas. The concern is not just military. Hamas also fears that if the world focuses on a successful U.S.-Iran agreement and regional stabilization, Gaza's issue could fade from the international agenda. Under such circumstances, Israel could continue its operations in the Strip while facing significantly reduced diplomatic pressure from the international community. Underlying these concerns is Hamas's fear that Gaza's reconstruction will remain stalled. Any regional agreement that does not mention Gaza risks making the existing situation worse. If the Strip stays outside new understandings, concerns grow that Gaza's residents will pay the price for regional de-escalation. Another worry is the possibility that Israel, with American approval, could revive emigration plans for Gaza. On May 27, after the killing of Mohammed Odeh, commander of Hamas's military wing in the Strip, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated, “the voluntary emigration plan from Gaza will also be implemented at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner.” Early in 2026, Minister Katz promoted an initiative to establish a dedicated administrative body to encourage the voluntary emigration of Gaza residents to foreign countries. This was built upon ideas previously raised by President Donald Trump about the future of Gaza. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.