Yoni Ben Menachem

The strategic center of gravity in the Middle East is gradually shifting from the confrontation with Iran to the struggle over the regional balance of power between Jerusalem and Ankara.

Following the degradation of the group's military infrastructure in Gaza, its external leadership has consolidated in Istanbul, raising new questions about Turkey's role and the West's counter-terrorism strategy.

Their expanding military cooperation indicates the formation of a new political and security axis. Israel is concerned this emerging Sunni alignment is a potentially greater long-term strategic challenge than the Iranian-led axis. The London-based daily Asharq Al-Awsat reported on July 19 that Egypt had concluded a joint military exercise with Turkey focusing on countering unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and conducting live-fire drills under unconventional combat scenarios. The exercise brought together Egyptian airborne and commando units alongside Turkish special forces. According to the report, the drill was part of an accelerating process of military rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara. This trend has been reflected in a growing number of joint exercises since the two countries signed a framework agreement on military cooperation approximately five months ago, during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Cairo in February. Senior Israeli security officials noted that the military capabilities demonstrated during the exercise are characteristic of armed forces preparing for future threats rather than for the wars of the past. They added that, in parallel with the Turkish exercise, Egypt also held a series of operational meetings with the Pakistani Navy, indicating that Cairo is simultaneously expanding its military partnerships into South Asia. According to senior diplomatic officials, the latest exercise is a direct continuation of the dramatic warming in relations between Egypt and Turkey, following more than a decade of severe tensions since the 2013 ouster of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, a leading figure of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since President Erdoğan's February visit to Cairo and the signing of the military framework agreement, security cooperation between the two countries has accelerated significantly. Within just a few months, the two militaries have conducted several joint exercises across air, land, and sea domains, including the Anatolian Eagle 2026 air exercise, which featured Egyptian F-16 fighter aircraft operating alongside Turkish and Azerbaijani aircraft. For both governments, the restoration of bilateral relations is driven not only by political considerations but also by the recognition that the Middle East's evolving strategic landscape requires greater cooperation among the region's leading powers. Drones Are Transforming the Battlefield One of the most significant aspects of the exercise was its emphasis on countering unmanned aerial threats. According to senior security officials, the wars in Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran have demonstrated that drones and unmanned aerial systems have become among the most significant threats on the modern battlefield. Both state and non-state actors increasingly rely on drones for intelligence gathering, precision strikes, and electronic warfare. Consequently, the exercise represented far more than tactical training; it reflected a joint effort by Egypt and Turkey to prepare for what has become an integral component of contemporary regional warfare. At the same time that Cairo is strengthening ties with Ankara, it is also deepening its defense relationship with Pakistan. The recent visit by the Commander of the Pakistan Navy to Alexandria, his meetings with senior Egyptian naval commanders, visits to Egyptian naval shipyards and the Naval Academy, and the series of joint exercises conducted over the past year all point to a clear trend toward expanding maritime security cooperation. Pakistan is widely regarded as one of the Muslim world's leading military powers, possessing extensive expertise in special operations, strategic deterrence, and maritime security. From Egypt's perspective, Pakistan represents a partner of considerable strategic value. A New Regional Axis These developments are unfolding as the Middle East undergoes a profound strategic realignment. According to senior Israeli security officials, the weakening of Iranian influence across several regional arenas, uncertainty surrounding future American engagement, the continuation of regional conflicts, and growing competition over trade routes and energy corridors are all driving Middle Eastern states to seek new regional security arrangements. Turkey seeks to expand its influence throughout the Middle East; Egypt aims to preserve its position as the Arab world's leading power; and Pakistan is working to strengthen its presence throughout both the Arab and broader Muslim worlds. Their growing cooperation serves the strategic interests of all three. The Israeli Perspective According to senior diplomatic officials, although the exercises were officially presented as professional counterterrorism training, it is difficult to ignore their broader strategic context. Turkey has adopted an increasingly confrontational political posture toward Israel in recent months and has repeatedly warned against what it describes as Israel's expanding regional influence. Egypt, despite maintaining its peace treaty and close security coordination with Israel, is also carefully monitoring regional developments while seeking to preserve both its regional status and its strategic freedom of action. Senior security officials say Egyptian officials have assured their American counterparts that expanding cooperation with Ankara and Islamabad should not be interpreted as the formation of an anti-Israel alliance. Rather, Cairo portrays the effort as part of a broader strategy to diversify its strategic partnerships and reduce dependence on any single international actor. Nevertheless, Israeli security officials argue that the growing series of joint military exercises, defense agreements, and high-level military exchanges among Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan indicates that a much broader strategic partnership is quietly taking shape. The three countries are no longer limiting themselves to political declarations but are gradually building interoperable capabilities across the air, maritime, and special operations domains. Should this trend continue, it could eventually produce one of the most significant security alliances in the Muslim world, one capable of reshaping not only the regional balance of power but also the way Middle Eastern states prepare for the security challenges of the coming decade. Senior Israeli security officials emphasize that the recent exercises should not be viewed as isolated events but rather as components of a much broader restructuring of the regional alliance system. According to these officials, a new Sunni axis is emerging, preparing to fill the strategic vacuum expected to be left by the collapse of the Iranian-led Shiite “Axis of Resistance” following the anticipated fall of the regime in Tehran. Although the exercises have been officially described as preparations for counterterrorism operations and defense against unmanned aerial threats, they also reflect a broader effort to establish joint operational capabilities among three of the most powerful militaries in the Muslim world. Israeli officials continue to regard the peace treaty and security cooperation with Egypt as one of Israel's most important strategic assets. At the same time, they stress that Cairo's rapidly expanding relationship with Ankara warrants scrutiny, particularly in light of President Erdoğan's ambition to position Turkey as the leading power in the Muslim world and as a counterweight to Israeli influence across the region. According to these officials, Pakistan's inclusion significantly broadens the scope of this emerging partnership. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed military power with advanced capabilities in special operations, air warfare, and missile technology. The strengthening of its defense ties with both Egypt and Turkey could eventually lay the groundwork for much broader military cooperation. At present, however, Israel assesses that the three countries are primarily adapting to a new regional reality characterized by declining Iranian influence in several theaters, uncertainty regarding the future extent of American commitment, and intensifying competition over global trade routes and energy corridors. Israeli officials caution, however, that regional dynamics can change rapidly. Over time, this emerging partnership could evolve into a military alliance directed against Israel, one that may prove considerably more formidable than the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance. Jerusalem is therefore monitoring these developments with growing concern, recognizing that any significant shift in the regional balance of power among the Middle East's major states could have profound implications for Israel's future security environment. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

August 2, 2026 Israeli security officials and senior PA figures believe that the conditions for a third intifada currently do not exist, but one crisis, on the Temple Mount for instance, could transform the security landscape within hours. According to Israeli security officials, the situation in the West Bank has reached a highly sensitive midpoint. It is more volatile than it was a year ago, yet it remains well short of the circumstances that triggered the Second Intifada in 2000. The immediate danger is not a large-scale popular uprising but rather the accumulation of isolated terrorist attacks and localized escalations that could eventually converge into a broader crisis, particularly if accompanied by unrest surrounding the Temple Mount. The recent violence in the village of Tel, in northern Samaria, where four Palestinians and two Israeli soldiers were killed during violent clashes involving Israeli settlers, has reignited debate over whether the West Bank is edging toward a third intifada. Senior Israeli security officials say that despite the intense discourse on Palestinian social media and the sharp incitement directed against settlers and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), a comprehensive assessment of developments on the ground indicates that the likelihood of a widespread popular uprising remains relatively low. At the same time, they warn of increasing motivation among lone attackers and organized Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad cells to carry out terrorist attacks. According to these officials, the reality on the ground is characterized by a gradual erosion of stability and a steady intensification of friction between Palestinians, Israeli settlers, and IDF forces. From the PA's perspective, the recent incidents are not isolated events but part of what it describes as a consistent Israeli policy aimed at expanding settlements, deepening Israeli control over the West Bank, and laying the groundwork for a future annexation. Palestinian officials and commentators argue that since the current Israeli government took office, settlement expansion, the establishment of unauthorized outposts, and Israeli security operations across Areas A, B, and C have all accelerated. They contend that the October 7 attack and the subsequent war in Gaza created an opportunity for Israel to expand its activities in the West Bank while international attention remained focused primarily on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. They point to a significant increase in settlement construction, the establishment of new farms and outposts, escalating confrontations between settlers and Palestinians, and intensified IDF operations in cities and refugee camps throughout northern Samaria. At the same time, they argue, the Palestinian Authority continues to lose both authority and influence on the ground. Despite their harsh criticism of Israeli policy, senior PA officials also acknowledge that the conditions that led to the Second Intifada are not present today. Palestinian society has been deeply weakened after years of intensive Israeli military operations, mass arrests, economic hardship, and the substantial dismantling of terrorist infrastructure in the refugee camps of Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm. This is compounded by the longstanding division between Fatah and Hamas, the absence of unified leadership, and the profound crisis of public confidence in the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. The policy of PA President Mahmoud Abbas, who seeks to avoid a broad military confrontation with Israel and preserve the stability of the Palestinian Authority's institutions, further reduces the likelihood of a comprehensive uprising. Consequently, although tensions remain high, they have not translated into a mass popular revolt. Palestinian commentators acknowledge that while the Palestinian cause currently enjoys broader international sympathy than in previous years, that support has not translated into effective political pressure on Israel, largely because of the weakness of the Palestinian leadership and the absence of a unified national strategy. Accordingly, both the Israeli security establishment and the PA assess that localized escalation is likely to continue, but without evolving into a full-scale third intifada in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, both sides warn that the continued erosion of stability, combined with the absence of any political horizon, could eventually create conditions in which a single local incident ignites a much broader confrontation. The Temple Mount: The Historical Trigger of Palestinian Uprisings Senior Israeli security officials emphasize that the one variable capable of rapidly transforming the situation is the Temple Mount. In July, terrorist organizations attempted to intensify incitement on social media following the visit of more than 4,000 Jewish worshippers to the site during the Jewish fast day of Tisha B'Av The Temple Mount remains the most sensitive flashpoint in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because it embodies religious, national, and symbolic dimensions simultaneously. Unlike territorial or security disputes, any perceived alteration of the long-standing status quo at the holy site, or even rumors of such a change, is widely viewed across the Muslim world as a direct threat to Al-Aqsa Mosque and has the potential to trigger widespread violence within a very short time. This pattern was evident during the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, the “Knife Intifada” in 2015, the Metal Detectors Crisis in 2017, the Bab al-Rahma (Golden Gate) crisis in 2019, and the events of “Operation Guardian of the Walls” in 2021. According to Israeli security officials, the Temple Mount is rarely the underlying cause of major confrontations. Rather, it serves as the catalyst that ignites political, national, and religious tensions that have accumulated over many years. For that reason, any crisis at the holy site can rapidly escalate from a localized disturbance in Jerusalem into a broad security confrontation encompassing the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and even the wider Arab and Muslim worlds. This explains the consistent recommendation of Israel's security establishment: during the current period of heightened sensitivity, Israel should exercise maximum restraint in preserving the status quo on the Temple Mount, maintain close coordination with Jordan, and prevent the emergence of prolonged crises. Bottom Line The prevailing assessment within Israel's security establishment is that the West Bank is not yet on the brink of a third intifada. Nevertheless, the security environment is becoming increasingly combustible. The cumulative effect of terrorist attacks, violent confrontations, and the continued absence of a political horizon could eventually create the conditions for a broader escalation. Should a crisis erupt simultaneously on the Temple Mount, the most volatile arena in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel could quickly find itself confronting a new security reality reminiscent of the opening stages of previous waves of large-scale violence. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

The attack on Egypt's strategic gas port was more than an isolated incident. It may mark the expansion of Iran's campaign into the Mediterranean, exposing new vulnerabilities in regional air defense, maritime security, and critical energy infrastructure. The drone attack on two gas vessels at the port of Damietta, on Egypt's Mediterranean coast, on July 29 was far more than a localized security incident. According to senior security officials, it could mark a strategic turning point in the confrontation between Iran, the United States, and their respective allies in the Middle East. For the first time, an Egyptian port serving as a major hub for the storage and export of natural gas has become a target in the regional conflict. Damietta is not simply a commercial port. It is home to one of the Eastern Mediterranean's important gas liquefaction facilities and serves as a key hub for exporting natural gas to European markets. Any disruption to its operations, therefore, extends beyond Egypt's borders and could affect global energy markets. Egypt's official acknowledgment that a drone carried out the attack has given the incident an entirely new dimension. Beyond the physical damage caused, the very penetration of Egyptian territory raises serious questions about the effectiveness of air-defense systems and the ability of regional states to counter Iran's growing long-range drone threat. The identity of the party responsible for the attack remains unclear, but security officials are focusing on the pro-Iranian axis. One possibility is that the drone was launched from Yemen by the Houthis, who have demonstrated in recent years an ability to operate long-range drones against Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other targets across the region. However, the distance between Yemen and Damietta is more than 2,000 kilometers. It would require the drone to cross areas covered by advanced radar and air-defense systems. Thus, while such an operation is technically possible, it would have been an exceptionally complex mission. Another possibility is that the drone was launched from Iraq by Iran-backed Shiite militias. The distance would be considerably shorter, but even such an operation would require the drone to traverse the airspace of Jordan, Syria, or Israel. This route would be difficult to execute without detection. According to security officials, however, the most troubling scenario may be the one receiving the least attention: that the drone was launched from the Mediterranean itself, using a commercial vessel, a civilian ship, or even a fishing boat converted into a launch platform. Such a method would dramatically shorten the drone's flight path to the target, enable it to bypass some land-based defense systems, and make early detection considerably more difficult. If this were indeed the method used, the implications would be significant: energy facilities and ports throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, in Egypt and Israel, and potentially in other countries, could become vulnerable targets. Such a scenario would require a fundamental reassessment of maritime defense doctrine and closer integration among intelligence services, naval forces, and air defense systems. Senior political officials say that, for Egypt, the incident goes far beyond a localized strike on a port. It represents a serious attack that challenges the country's sovereignty and its status as a central pillar of regional stability. Cairo has invested substantial resources in recent years in building an advanced security apparatus and presenting itself as a regional anchor of stability. A successful attack on a strategic target deep inside Egyptian territory inevitably undermines that image to some degree. The United States, according to these officials, also faces another test. If the attack was indeed carried out by one of the organizations belonging to the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” it represents a direct message to Washington: Iran is capable of expanding the battlefield and threatening American interests even in arenas previously regarded as relatively secure. Israel, too, cannot ignore the development. If the drone arrived from the Mediterranean or crossed extensive airspace without being intercepted, it would constitute a clear warning about the changing nature of the aerial threat in the region. According to security officials, the implications extend beyond the protection of Israel's civilian population. They also concern the security of offshore gas platforms, seaports, commercial shipping lanes, and energy infrastructure throughout the Mediterranean. These assets could become an integral part of the region's future conflict environment. Iran Is Expanding the Rules of Engagement From Tehran's perspective, targeting energy infrastructure increases the cost of confrontation for the United States and its allies. Rather than limiting itself to direct military confrontation, Iran seeks to demonstrate that any escalation of the war could be accompanied by disruptions to global energy supplies, higher oil and gas prices, and disruptions to international trade. This is a particularly effective pressure mechanism against Europe, which is increasingly dependent on alternative sources of natural gas. Even if Tehran continues to avoid taking direct responsibility for the Damietta attack, security officials say the incident fits well with Iran's established pattern of “operational ambiguity.” According to them, Iran benefits from using its regional proxies while avoiding confrontation that could trigger a broader retaliation against Tehran itself. This model allows Iran to send deterrence messages, test the limits of its adversaries' responses, and gradually expand the operational reach of the “Axis of Resistance,” while maintaining a degree of political deniability. Security officials say the significance of the Damietta attack lies not only in the damage it caused, but primarily in what it may herald: a new phase in the regional confrontation. If it is established that Iran-backed actors are capable of striking strategic infrastructure in Egypt, the implications would be profound. The conflict would no longer be confined to Israel, the Red Sea, or the Persian Gulf. Under such circumstances, Egypt, Israel, the United States, and their allies would be forced to reassess their regional defense strategies. The threat would no longer be concentrated solely along land borders. It would extend into the Mediterranean, across energy corridors, and toward the region's economic centers. That would represent a strategic shift capable of shaping the Middle East for years to come. Direct Implications for Israel Senior Israeli security officials believe that the expansion of the conflict toward the Mediterranean will require an adjustment of Israel's defense doctrine. Until now, much of the threat assessment has focused on the axis stretching from Iran through Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Red Sea. A new possibility is now emerging: an additional maritime front in which civilian vessels, commercial ships, or disguised maritime platforms could serve as launch sites for drones and cruise missiles. Such a development would require a significant strengthening of maritime early-warning capabilities, closer intelligence cooperation among Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and the United States, and expanded protection for offshore gas platforms, seaports, desalination facilities, and national energy infrastructure. From an Israeli perspective, the issue is no longer simply the defense of the country's borders. It is the protection of the broader network of strategic assets across the Eastern Mediterranean. Israeli defense officials believe Egypt has a clear interest in determining as quickly as possible who was responsible for the attack. Any damage to Egypt's image as a stable state capable of maintaining security along its coastline and controlling its maritime routes could affect both its regional standing and foreign investment in its energy and gas sectors. If it is determined that the drone penetrated Egyptian airspace without being detected in real time by the country's defense systems, Egypt is likely to invest heavily in upgrading its detection and interception capabilities and to deepen its security cooperation with the United States and other countries in the region. The Damietta attack, therefore, may prove to be more than an isolated strike on Egyptian infrastructure. It could mark the emergence of a new dimension in the regional conflict—one in which the Mediterranean, its ports, energy infrastructure, and maritime trade routes become increasingly exposed to the strategic competition between Iran and its adversaries. If that assessment proves correct, the rules of the game in the Middle East may indeed be changing. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

Officials warn the “Mecca Agreement” could evolve into an independent Muslim security bloc, undermine normalization efforts, and weaken Israel's regional position. The defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, known as the “Mecca Agreement,” is increasingly being viewed in Israel not as yet another diplomatic arrangement between Muslim states, but as a strategic development that could gradually alter the balance of power in the Middle East, according to senior Israeli political officials. According to these officials, Israel has already begun formulating a response through a series of measures: strengthening security and intelligence ties with India vis-à-vis Pakistan; deepening its partnership with Greece and Cyprus in response to Turkey; and seeking to exploit differences between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in an effort to contain Riyadh's growing regional influence. However, Jerusalem's primary concern is that the new trilateral defense alliance could become the nucleus of a broader regional framework, eventually joined by Egypt and additional Arab and Muslim states. In such a scenario, Israel could find itself facing an independent regional bloc with significant military, economic and strategic capabilities, one that does not necessarily rely on the United States and does not necessarily regard Israel's military superiority as a regional asset. “This is the development that currently concerns Israeli decision-makers,” a senior Israeli political official said. The Israeli concern is prompting the political establishment to consider a network of countervailing alliances that could balance the emerging Sunni axis. Concerning Pakistan, Israel is seeking to deepen security, intelligence and economic cooperation with India. In response to Turkey, Israel is looking to strengthen its strategic partnership with Greece and Cyprus, which in recent years has become one of the main pillars of Israel's position in the eastern Mediterranean. Toward Saudi Arabia, Jerusalem is seeking to preserve its relationship with the United Arab Emirates and leverage differences between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to prevent the emergence of a broader Saudi-Turkish front. A senior Israeli political official said that the Iran-led Shiite “axis of resistance” has weakened while the Sunni axis is growing stronger. Israel, he argued, therefore needs to respond by developing alternative alliances with Greece and Cyprus, as well as with India and the UAE. Israel, he added, must build a network of strategic partnerships around itself to prevent a dramatic shift in the regional balance of power. Senior Israeli officials fear that the Mecca Agreement could gradually evolve into an independent regional security architecture, potentially developing into a kind of third bloc in the Middle East, not the Iranian axis and not the US-Israel alliance, but an independent Muslim framework led by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. If additional countries, particularly Egypt, joined, the consequences could be far-reaching. From Israel's perspective, the concern is not simply the size of the armed forces of the countries forming the new security alliance. It is the combination of their respective capabilities. Turkey has NATO's second-largest military and an advanced defense industry. Pakistan has a large military and a nuclear capability. Saudi Arabia brings economic power, energy resources and a central position in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The combination of these three powers could prove far more significant than the sum of their individual capabilities. For Israel, the most important question now is not why Egypt did not join the agreement, but whether, and when it might do so. Egypt possesses a large military, a huge population, a strategically critical geographic position and a direct border with Israel. It is also the most historically and politically influential Arab state. Egyptian accession to the Mecca Agreement could fundamentally alter the equation. It would not only increase the alliance's military weight, but also give it broad Arab legitimacy and make it more attractive to additional countries. From the Israeli perspective, this scenario could transform the Mecca Agreement from a limited defense pact into the foundation of a new regional structure. What Happens to Saudi-Israeli Normalization? Another major question is the future of normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel in light of these developments. Senior officials in Jerusalem say that this possibility is becoming increasingly remote. Israel has invested considerable effort in recent years in promoting the possibility of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. But the war in Gaza, the confrontation with Iran and the strengthening of the Turkish-Saudi-Pakistani axis have created a different strategic environment. From Israel's perspective, the Mecca Agreement may signal that Saudi Arabia wants to build its own security umbrella, one that is not dependent on Israel and does not rely exclusively on the United States. That would represent a significant shift. For years, Israeli strategy was based on the assumption that the Iranian threat would push moderate Arab states closer to Israel. The recent wars, however, could produce the opposite result: the emergence of an independent Muslim security framework. Turkey Becomes a Strategic Challenge for Israel Another significant development is that Turkey is increasingly becoming a strategic problem for Israel. Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, relations between Jerusalem and Ankara have deteriorated to an unprecedented low. At the same time, Turkey has expanded its influence in Syria. Jerusalem is concerned about Turkey's continued entrenchment in Syria and the possibility that Ankara could assist in rebuilding the Syrian military and even deploy air-defense systems there. Such a scenario could restrict Israel's freedom of aerial action in Syria and create a situation in which any Israeli-Turkish confrontation would no longer be a bilateral conflict between two states. Instead, it could become a confrontation with a country leading a broader regional framework. Pakistan Adds a Nuclear Dimension Pakistan introduces an entirely different dimension into the equation: nuclear capability. Israel is concerned that ties between Islamabad and Riyadh could deepen in the strategic sphere as well. Saudi Arabia has been advancing a civilian nuclear program in recent years, and its relationship with Pakistan could potentially provide Riyadh with knowledge, experience and strategic infrastructure that it does not currently possess. There is no indication that Saudi Arabia is currently seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the very possibility of a Pakistani nuclear umbrella extending over countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey could alter the strategic discourse in the region. According to senior Israeli security officials, the recent war and the confrontation with Tehran demonstrated to the Gulf states how vulnerable they are to a regional conflict beyond their control. This, they argue, is driving their desire to establish their own security mechanism. From this perspective, the Mecca Agreement could represent an attempt by Muslim states to reduce their dependence on Washington and create a regional mechanism capable of addressing both the Iranian threat and the prospect of another war in the region. For Israel, this represents a major disappointment. Jerusalem has spent years seeking to persuade Arab states that Israel can be part of the solution to the Iranian threat. The Mecca Agreement raises a different possibility: that these states may seek to address their security challenges on their own. Senior Israeli political officials believe that if the trilateral alliance strengthens and attracts additional countries, it could eventually become a key actor in Middle East security and stability. For Washington, such a development could actually prove convenient. It would allow the United States to reduce its military presence in the region and shift some responsibility for regional security to its local partners. For Israel, however, that could be bad news. Israel currently enjoys a unique position as the United States' principal military ally in the Middle East. If Washington can rely on a regional Muslim framework to provide part of the region's collective security, Israel's position as a central pillar of the emerging regional order could gradually weaken. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

August 24, 2026 Mahmoud Abbas wants elections to rehabilitate the PA; Hamas wants them to rebuild its political power; and Israel fears that the ballot box could turn the achievements of the war into a political victory for Hamas. The Hamas-affiliated Al-Risalah Net reported on August 22 that PA President Mahmoud Abbas's announcement that elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council will be held on November 28 has revived the Palestinian political system. At the center of these developments is Hamas, which is seeking to translate its influence on the ground into political power by participating in the elections and forging alliances with other Palestinian factions and political figures. According to the report, the Hamas leadership held meetings in Istanbul with Fadwa Barghouti, the wife of senior Fatah figure Marwan Barghouti, who is imprisoned in Israel, as well as with former Palestinian foreign minister Nasser al-Qudwa. The discussions focused on the possibility of their participation in the elections and the formation of broad national lists, rather than lists identified exclusively with a particular faction. The talks subsequently moved to Cairo, where an initiative emerged to establish an alliance bringing together Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the reformist current within Fatah led by Mohammed Dahlan, Nasser al-Qudwa and other political forces. The door remains open to the participation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The site also reports that, in parallel, a first high-level meeting between Fatah and Hamas is expected in Cairo. Fatah is expected to be represented by senior PA officials Hussein al-Sheikh, Majed Faraj and Rawhi Fattouh. The meeting could lead to broad national understandings. Still, it could also reflect an attempt by Fatah to contain a political initiative taking shape, at least partly, outside the traditional political framework. According to Hamas, the talks are taking place against the backdrop of the weakness of the PA, the economic crisis, the war in Gaza and growing pressure in the West Bank. The report argues that the various Palestinian factions understand that they are effectively “in the same boat” and need a political framework capable of confronting these challenges. Nevertheless, Hamas maintains that the key remains in Mahmoud Abbas's hands. He can set the elections in motion, but he can also postpone or cancel them. According to Hamas, from Fatah's and Mahmoud Abbas's perspective, the elections carry significant risks because of internal divisions and multiple centers of power, above all the possibility that Hamas could achieve a substantial political breakthrough. Senior Fatah officials told me that Mahmoud Abbas is determined to hold parliamentary elections followed by presidential elections to reshape the Palestinian political system and show the international community that the PA supports a democratic process for choosing its representatives. The last Palestinian legislative elections were held in 2006, when Hamas won a majority. A year later, Hamas forcibly expelled the PA from the Gaza Strip. According to the Fatah officials, the upcoming elections will constitute a political and strategic test of strength between the PA and Hamas. Mahmoud Abbas hopes to strengthen the PA through the process, based partly on the expectation that the Israeli Knesset elections scheduled for October could result in a change of government, potentially allowing negotiations with Israel to resume. According to Fatah officials, Mahmoud Abbas views the Legislative Council elections as a way to restore the PA's legitimacy. After years in which the Palestinian political system has suffered a crisis of legitimacy, they believe genuine elections, even if partial and problematic, could give the PA a new base of legitimacy among the Palestinian public and in the eyes of Western governments. At the same time, PA President Mahmoud Abbas is seeking to prevent Hamas from participating in the elections. He has conditioned its participation on Hamas accepting the international commitments undertaken by the PLO and recognizing Israel. Senior PA officials told me that Hamas is attempting to circumvent Mahmoud Abbas's restrictions by participating in the upcoming elections as part of a broad coalition with other Palestinian factions, thereby strengthening its political position following what they describe as its failure in the Gaza war. According to PA officials, elections for the Legislative Council would not immediately alter the balance of power within the PA. Even if Hamas achieved a significant electoral breakthrough, it would not necessarily mean it would take control of the Palestinian government. The Palestinian political system remains based on the presidency, security services, and governmental institutions controlled by PA President Mahmoud Abbas. Thus, legislative elections could produce a new balance of political power, but not necessarily a change of government. The Palestinian presidential elections, planned for the first quarter of 2027, could prove to be the truly decisive stage. The leading candidate to replace Mahmoud Abbas, who is reportedly seeking to promote his son Yasser for the position, is senior Fatah figure Marwan Barghouti, who is serving five life sentences in an Israeli prison and enjoys considerable popularity among Palestinians. The United States and other Western countries are demanding that the PA implement reforms, change its governing mechanisms and improve its public legitimacy. From their perspective, a reformed and more democratic Palestinian Authority is a prerequisite for any future international involvement in the political process. Israel Is a Decisive Factor in Whether the Elections Take Place Senior Israeli security officials say that the Shin Bet has identified increased Hamas activity in the West Bank ahead of the Legislative Council elections. Hamas, they say, is attempting to translate its strength on the ground into political power, while simultaneously intensifying incitement against Israel and its terrorist activities. According to these officials, Hamas has not abandoned its longstanding objective of overthrowing the PA in the West Bank. They also say that Hamas is coordinating its preparations for the elections with former senior Fatah official Mohammed Dahlan, who was expelled from the Palestinian territories by Mahmoud Abbas. Israeli security officials assess that Hamas is seeking to build a broad coalition with additional Palestinian factions and enter the elections as a significant political bloc. The new bloc's objective would be to challenge Fatah's dominance of the Palestinian political system. Hamas is expected to use the elections as a means of re-entering Palestinian governing institutions, while exploiting the Palestinian Authority's economic and political weakness. Senior Israeli security officials are concerned about the possibility of a Hamas victory in the Legislative Council elections and a repeat of the 2006 scenario. According to these officials, Israel should act in a calculated manner to bring about a postponement of the elections. One senior security official suggested that Israel could announce that it would not allow residents of East Jerusalem to participate in the elections, thereby increasing internal pressure within Palestinian society on Mahmoud Abbas to postpone the vote, as has happened in the past. The Israeli concern is not merely about who wins at the ballot box. The larger question is what would happen if Hamas achieved a significant electoral breakthrough and demanded to re-enter Palestinian governing institutions. According to Israeli security officials, if Hamas enters the elections with considerable strength in the West Bank, forms coalitions, and takes advantage of Fatah and the PA's weakness, it could gain significant political power even without winning an outright majority. One senior Israeli security official argues that Israel must prevent the elections, describing them as a strategic event and an attempt by Hamas to rebuild its power and gain a political reward for the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack. According to the official, Israel should already be acting in the West Bank to disrupt Hamas's efforts to strengthen itself ahead of the elections through arrests, the seizure of funds and the blocking of financial support to the organization. Ultimately, however, the decision rests with Israel's political leadership. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

August 31, 2026 Abbas appears concerned that elections could strengthen Hamas and Mohammed Dahlan and create a new balance of power in the Palestinian arena. Senior officials in the Fatah movement say that, at this stage, the more likely scenario is that Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas will opt to postpone the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council. Not because the elections are unimportant to him, but precisely because they could produce a new political reality whose outcome would be difficult to control. These officials told me that Hussein al-Sheikh, deputy chairman of the PA, is driving this trend. He is trying to persuade Mahmoud Abbas to approve a postponement and justify it on technical grounds, arguing that the Central Elections Commission cannot hold elections in the Gaza Strip or in East Jerusalem. The Final Decision Rests with Abbas Senior security officials say Abbas remains the Palestinian figure best positioned to set the timetable and the rules of the political game. He is chairman of Fatah, chairman of the PLO, and head of the PA. Therefore, any attempt to rebuild the Palestinian political system must account for his position. But from Abbas's perspective, elections carry considerable risks. First, they could give Hamas and its allies significant political power. Second, an alliance between Hamas and Mohammed Dahlan's camp could create a new center of power within the Palestinian political system, one that Abbas might find difficult to control. Third, elections held under the current circumstances could turn into a referendum on the PA and its leadership, which is widely regarded as corrupt by the Palestinian public. On the other hand, postponing the elections would give Abbas additional time to manage the political system, assess developments in Gaza, and attempt to reach internal arrangements within Fatah itself, which remains divided, before the Palestinian public is called upon to make its choice at the ballot box. There is also a practical problem on the ground: holding Palestinian elections under the current circumstances would be extremely difficult. In the Gaza Strip, the security situation, the governing mechanism, and the ability to conduct a regular electoral process remain uncertain. In Jerusalem, there is the question of Palestinian voting. Israel opposes allowing residents of East Jerusalem to participate in the elections, while in Area C of the West Bank, Israel could make political and organizational activity more difficult. From Washington's perspective, Palestinian elections are not necessarily at the top of the agenda. The American focus is on the administration of the Gaza Strip and arrangements for the day after the war. Senior security officials also point to the timing in relation to Israel's political system. If the Palestinian elections were held shortly after the Israeli Knesset elections, scheduled for October 27, they could coincide with a sensitive period of coalition-building and the formation of a new government. In such a scenario, Israel could oppose even more strongly the holding of elections in East Jerusalem, Gaza, and parts of the territories under its control. Senior PA officials say that internal reconciliation within Fatah is the real test. This is why the meetings in Cairo matter, but there has still been no breakthrough in efforts to reconcile with the reformist faction led by Dahlan. The new reality in Gaza has forced Fatah and Dahlan's reformist camp to reassess their relationship. For years, the internal split was primarily an organizational and political matter. Now it has become part of the struggle over the shape of the Palestinian political system on the day after the war. Dahlan's camp is expected to demand the reinstatement of Fatah members expelled from the movement, the restoration of their rights, the integration of their supporters into Fatah institutions, and agreements on the future distribution of political power. The two sides may begin with a gradual roadmap: confidence-building measures, an end to their mutual smear campaigns, the establishment of a joint committee to address disputes, and agreement on the rules governing participation in the elections. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan want to reunify the Fatah movement, understanding that Fatah's unity could be a prerequisite for rebuilding the Palestinian national political system. From these countries' perspective, continued division within Fatah weakens the PA. It makes it more difficult to establish a Palestinian political framework capable of addressing the challenges of the postwar period. For this reason, Abbas cannot ignore the demands of Egypt and other key Arab states, partly because he fears doing so could damage his relations with regional actors on whom he depends. Ultimately, senior Fatah officials say, the question is not simply whether the Palestinians want elections. The real question is whether Abbas will conclude that elections serve his political interests and those of Fatah. At the present stage, the answer appears to be no. The Gaza Strip remains unstable, Hamas is seeking a new framework for political participation, Dahlan is gaining strength in the regional arena, and Fatah itself remains divided. Under these circumstances, elections could produce an outcome that Abbas would be unable to control. Therefore, senior Fatah officials assess that the more likely scenario is postponing the Legislative Council elections to a later date, citing key justifications such as the security and political situation in Gaza, the difficulty of holding elections in East Jerusalem, and the uncertainty surrounding the arrangements for the day after the war. But postponement also carries a price. If it turns into an indefinite delay, it could deepen the PA's legitimacy crisis and strengthen the argument that the Fatah leadership is afraid to face the verdict of the voters. The Bottom Line Abbas still holds the key to the elections. He can open the door to the ballot box, and he can close it. The question is whether he will risk an unpredictable outcome at the polls or buy himself additional time by postponing the elections. The final decision is expected to be made soon. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

September 3, 2026 The capture of Muin al-Arabid in the heart of Gaza City is a strategic message underscoring that Israel is not returning to full-scale war, but is also not allowing Hamas to exploit the ceasefire to rebuild its military capabilities. Table of Contents No headings were found on this page. The capture on September 1, 2026, of Muin al-Arabid, head of Hamas's internal security apparatus in the Gaza Strip, is far more than a successful operation by the Shin Bet and the IDF. It offers another glimpse into how Israel intends to manage its campaign against Hamas during the ceasefire, as Hamas seeks to rebuild its military strength, according to senior security officials, who describe the operation as a major achievement for the Shin Bet under the command of David Zini. According to these officials, Muin al-Arabid is an “intelligence treasure,” and the information in his possession is expected to help Israel understand what Hamas is planning and expose what they describe as Hamas's deception campaign, in which the organization claims that it is supposedly prepared to disarm. Senior political officials say that, at this stage, Israel is not returning to a broad ground offensive in Gaza and does not currently intend to violate the ceasefire and plunge the Strip back into full-scale war. Instead, Israel is seeking to prevent Hamas from rebuilding its military strength while continuing to settle accounts with terrorists who took part in the atrocities of October 7, 2023, as part of its policy of targeted killings. Senior security officials estimate that approximately 3,000 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives remain on Israel's target list and have yet to be eliminated. Israel's campaign is based on highly precise intelligence, special forces, and the Israeli Air Force (IAF). According to security officials, Israel has added a new dimension to its war against Hamas. Yesterday's ground operation in the al-Katiba area of western Gaza City illustrates this new reality: Israel is no longer relying solely on airstrikes and targeted killings from the air, but is also conducting ground operations deep inside enemy territory. A special Shin Bet force, assisted by the IDF, infiltrated the area where Hamas operates and reached al-Arabid's home. The force captured him while he was wounded and extracted him from the Gaza Strip. The IAF struck threats that endangered the force and provided air cover throughout the operation. According to Israel, the force returned without casualties. According to security officials, Israel has demonstrated that it possesses the intelligence and operational capabilities required to penetrate the heart of Hamas's infrastructure and arrest a senior figure in the organization. This, they say, reflects a failure by Hamas and reinforces Israeli deterrence. For Hamas, however, the fact that the Shin Bet and the IDF captured its internal security chief is the real problem. The organization is now trying to claim that Muin al-Arabid was merely a security officer, not the head of its internal security apparatus. Analysts in the Gaza Strip acknowledge that the operation represents a failure for Hamas. They said the shock from the successful Shin Bet and IDF operation is considerable. According to them, Hamas's security apparatus suffered a major failure in protecting the organization from Israeli intelligence penetration. Preventing espionage, identifying collaborators, protecting senior commanders, and maintaining the secrecy of senior officials' hiding places are among the apparatus's primary responsibilities. Hamas failed on all of these fronts. From the perspective of Israeli intelligence, security officials say, the operation could continue to yield results long after it has ended. Al-Arabid is not merely a senior official. He is believed to possess extensive knowledge of the people, structures, and methods Hamas is using in an effort to continue operating in the Strip. His interrogation could provide information about Hamas's internal security network, the security arrangements protecting senior officials, hiding places, communications systems, the movement of operatives, and the mechanisms of control that Hamas is attempting to rebuild. According to security officials, the operation is also a psychological warfare success. It is likely to increase suspicion and mistrust within Hamas and undermine the organization's morale. According to a joint statement by the IDF and Shin Bet, al-Arabid was involved in Hamas efforts to reestablish its control over northern Gaza and promote attacks against IDF troops. Now, Israeli security officials say, Hamas's entire plan may be laid bare before the IDF, enabling Israel to thwart it. According to security sources, Israel made the decision to carry out the operation alone. However, the Trump administration was briefed afterward and was informed of the operation's importance in thwarting Hamas's terrorist plans. The bottom line, according to a senior security official, is that Israel cannot currently occupy the entire Gaza Strip. The ceasefire agreement constrains it, but it is continuing to act against Hamas attempts to rebuild its military capabilities. The battlefield in Gaza, the official says, has effectively become a hunting ground, in which Israel is using precise intelligence to gradually but consistently eliminate operatives belonging to Hamas's military wing. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Yoni Ben Menachem Yoni Ben Menachem, a veteran Arab affairs and diplomatic commentator for Israel Radio and Television, is a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center. He served as Director General and Chief Editor of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. Share this Invest in JCFA Subscribe to Daily Alert The Daily Alert – Israel news digest appears every Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.

P.A. leader Mahmoud Abbas appears concerned that elections could strengthen Hamas and Mohammed Dahlan and create a new balance of power in the Palestinian arena.