Stuart Johnson

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"The next point to be considered is how it could happen that the Broad-Street starting signal and the distant-signal from the New-Inn-Yard cabin could both be lowered at a time when the up-goods-train was crossing or about to cross the down-main-line at the New-Inn-Yard cabin. The signals at the approach to the Broad-Street station were at that time in a state of transition. The starting signal was, so to speak, on the wrong side of the distant-signal, that is to say, on the north of it, and was not interlocked with the signals of the New-Inn-Yard cabin. This signal has since fallen into disuse; the arms have been removed and the post is to be taken away; and it has been replaced by a starting-signal immediately at the end of the platform, which will better answer the purpose. The distant-signal from the New-Inn-Yard cabin had been worked according to the common practice of the North-London Railway, in such a way that it remained off excepting in case of obstruction. It is the general rule on the railways of this country that all distant-signals worked from junction-cabins shall remain, as well as the home-signals, at danger, and shall only be lowered for a train to pass when it is right for the train to do so. The occurrence of this collision is an important instance of the disadvantage of departing from that rule, because the engine-driver was misled, and was induced, apparently, to pass this signal, and to believe that the line was clear for him to run towards Shoreditch, at a time when a dangerous obstruction was being or was about to be made within 478 yards of the point from which he started."

I came across this video last year and have waited for some time to see if something else would radically change my perspective. Most of the rest of 2-10 on the list are posts here on LessWrong, so I thought I would share this as well.

"The whole of the witnesses agree that the speed of the train, when entering the station, was very moderate and I think it probably did not exceed hand-brake speed. The driver says that when about halfway down the platform he found that the hand-brakes (tender and two brake-vans) were not pulling the train up sufficiently, and I can therefore only surmise that those brakes were not applied quite soon enough, or, which is more probable, that they were not on as tightly as they are represented to have been. As soon as the driver realised the state of affairs he applied his vacuum-brake with full force, with the result that all the wheels of the train"picked up"or"skidded."He noticed that the two indicators of his gauge showed the vacuum to have been destroyed both in the train pipe and in the vacuum chamber, and he assumed from this that the automatic-brake was out of order; he then tried to reverse his engine, by which time it had struck the vehicles standing at the buffer-stops, with the result already stated."

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"The accident occurred on a Saturday evening, and on Saturdays it is usual to run the train into No. 10 platform, where there is no outer home, or intermediate, platform signal; a driver having once seen No. 3 cabin signal lowered, knows that No. 10 line is clear up to No. 2 cabin. For trains entering No. 9 line, the lowering of No. 3 cabin signal may or may not have the same meaning as it has in the case of No. 10 platform; the only certain intimation given to the driver is that the line is clear up to the outer home signal of No. 2 cabin. That signal is 36 yards inside the station roof, and, as stated above, owing to the curve, &c., there is a very poor view indeed of the signal or of anything standing in front of it. It is said to be a most unusual thing to bring a train into No. 9 when the line is occupied between the inner and outer home signals, although the station working sometimes makes it necessary to do so- as the drivers are fully aware. Driver Copland and the driver of the light engine both informed me that on previous occasions they had always received some warning from the station staff, or signalmen, if there was any obstruction immediately ahead of the outer home signal, but there appears to be no rule or instruction to this effect.

"In the above remarks I have accepted the suggestion that the cock in the air pipe was closed when the train left Berwick, but I am by no means convinced of the truth of that explanation. There is no doubt that the cock was found closed by brake inspectors O'Donnell and Redican; but in justice to fireman Walton, who was lying unconscious at the time that these men examined the brake apparatus, it must be remembered that this discovery was not made till at least five minutes after the accident, during which interval driver Gardner was alone upon his engine, and had therefore ample time and opportunity of closing the cock himself, with the object of shifting some, if not all, of the blame from his own shoulders on to that of his fireman. Walton assured me that he had made the connections properly at Berwick, and as he is a man of experience, and a passed driver, it is probable that he did so. Moreover, all the incidents of the journey, the starting of the train without difficulty from Berwick after the change of engines, the checking of the speed by means of the brake at Scremerston and elsewhere, the fluctuation of the air gauges in the guards' vans, and the somewhat inconsistent remarks made by the driver to the brake inspectors when they drew his attention to the position of the tap, seem to me to favour the view that the brake was in proper order, and the cock opened when the train left Berwick. If this were so, the most probable explanation of the accident would seem to be that driver Gardner did not expect that his train, which was an important express, would be stopped outside Newcastle, that he therefore approached the place at an undue rate of speed, and was therefore not able to pull up at the Dean Street signals when he found them at danger."

"The accident must clearly have been caused by some movement of the siding points which are"facing"to a train travelling towards Stoke, during the passage of the train over them. The absence of any mark on the switches, and rails adjacent to them, is sufficient proof that the wheels did not mount the rails, while the existence of the facing point bolt would render it impossible for the pressure of the engine wheels against the switch rails to cause the thin ends of the switches to spring open. But in the absence of a locking bar, there was nothing to prevent the signalman from withdrawing the bolt by operating the lever which works it in the signal-box, and from moving the points themselves in the intervals between the passage over them of each successive pair of wheels. There is no doubt that when the driver first started from the platform, the points were right for the main line, and the disc signal"off,"and signalman Orwell denies having touched the levers until after the accident. But the facts afford strong evidence that the points were moved, and I have little doubt that Orwell, having allowed the usual time to elapse for the train to get clear of the points, and not having noticed that it had been stopped by the guard on account of the open door, reversed the points at the moment that the train was making its second start, and caused the wheels of the second carriage to"split,"the front wheels taking the proper road and the rear wheels the siding. It is probable that after he had done this the rattling of the levers in the frame drew Orwell's attention to the fact that something was wrong, and that he then pulled over the point lever again, thereby allowing the rear vehicle to take the proper road, after the middle of the train had gone along the siding."

"At about 5.10 p.m. another down goods train (2.10 from Hartlepool) arrived at Seaton Bank Head cabin, 2 3/4 miles south of Ryhope Junction. Here the train came to a stand, in accordance with the rules, to enable the guard to pin down waggon brakes before descending the steep gradients of Seaton Bank. The train had 22 laden and five empty waggons, and the Company's instructions would appear to require five brakes only to be pinned down on the laden waggons in favourable weather. Guard Fox says he pinned down five brakes as above, and also the brakes on two empty cattle waggons at the tail end of the train. The driver states that he had to give his engine steam to start the train, but that he closed the regulator again before the whole of the waggons were on the incline. Very shortly after passing through Seaton station, which is only half a mile below Bank Head, when on the falling gradient of 1 in 44, he realized he had lost control of his train. Although the engine and tender brakes were applied, the sand valves were opened, and the engine was reversed, the train is stated to have continued to gain speed for a time, without however attaining any very high rate of speed. Passing through Ryhope station, about two miles from Seaton, where the inclination of the line is rather easier, on a curve of 20 chains radius, the trainmen think speed was reduced somewhat; here, all signals were against them, and after running about 300 yards further the collision took place."

Abstract Myosin-VIIA (MYO7A) is an unconventional myosin responsible for syndromic (Usher 1B) or nonsyndromic forms of deafness in humans when mutated.